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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1988 Education Reform Act, parents in England have had the right to 
express a preference for the school their child attends. This is done through an 
application form to their local authority (LA), which then assigns pupils to schools
1. 
The Education and Inspections Act of 2006 strengthened the role of parental choice in 
this assignment, banning covert selection of pupils by schools, establishing ‘choice 
advisors’ for parents, and providing free transport to school for the most 
disadvantaged. The reforms were based on the idea that allowing parents to choose 
their school (instead of attending their local school by default) would increase 
educational standards; schools would improve their performance when they were 




While the theoretical benefits of school choice as a policy are clear, the existing 
evidence on its impact is mixed (see section 2). Our reading of the literature is that 
competition, as it currently exists in England, has not significantly improved the 
academic performance of schools. This may be because parental choice in England is 
not operating as the theoretical model suggests; for example, parents may be 
constrained in their choice which hinders the market mechanism. Alternatively, 
parents may not value academic standards, and so schools do not compete (and raise 
their standards) on this criteria. Parents may place value on the “wrong” school 
characteristics (Schnieder and Buckly (2002)), such as the performance of the 
schools’ sports team, or social status of the pupil intake. In this paper we investigate 
this central premise of the theoretical model, namely that parents value academic 
standards. Specifically we ask: do parents value academic standards as one of the 
most important reasons for their choice of school, or are other characteristics more 
important? What do parents really want from schools? And do different types of 
parents have similar preferences across school characteristics?  
 
We investigate these issues by first following the majority of the literature and 
examining parents’ stated preferences. Second, we look at parents’ revealed 
preferences for schools, i.e. their actual choice of school as opposed to what they say 
they value in a school. This enables us to investigate the extent to which parents tend 
to choose schools which perform better than others in their area in terms of academic 
achievement compared to social and/or ethnic composition, and how this varies across 
parental type. Through looking at parents’ revealed preferences we elicit information 
that is unlikely to be found through analysis of stated preferences alone.  
 
We also ask the degree to which parents’ actual choices are constrained by their 
geographical location and proximity to their most preferred school
3. We address this 
                                                 
1 Admission to an oversubscribed school is determined by the school’s admissions code. This code can 
vary, but most schools operate on distance and siblings based criteria. More details can be found in 
section 4, or see Pennell, West and Hind (2006). 
2 In the past, access to an oversubscribed school has depended solely on proximity. Evidence suggests 
that this has increased house prices in desirable catchment areas (Gibbons and Machin (2003)). This 
effectively prohibits access for pupils with parents that are priced out of the market. 
3 If a school is oversubscribed, the school's published admissions criteria are used to determine which 
children should be offered places. These criteria have traditionally included geographical criteria such 
as distance from the home to the school or the school’s 'catchment area', along with other criteria such 3 
by exploring how many schools are feasible for parents and how the quality varies 
within this set of schools. How many pupils attend their closest (or default) school? 
And do these proportions vary by family type? Finally, are some types of families 
more likely to get their first choice school?  
 
To address these questions we use an innovative combination of survey and 
administrative data that comprises the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS) and the 
administrative data held on each state school pupil by the Department for Children, 
Schools and Families
4. The combination of rich longitudinal data in the MCS with 
administrative data provides a powerful research resource which enables us to add to 
the international academic literature on school choice and to the policy debate in 
Britain.  
 
The paper is set out as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the relevant literature 
both on school markets and choice. That is followed by a discussion of our data in 
section 3. We then present our results and conclusions in sections 4 and 5. 
 
 
2. Policy background and related literature 
 
In the UK, the Education Reform Act of 1988 introduced a school choice mechanism 
which gave parents the right to express a preference for the school their child would 
attend. Funding for a particular school depended largely on the number of pupils on 
the school roll, so schools had an incentive to enrol more pupils. To do this the school 
had to compete with other schools in the area, along the dimensions that parents cared 
about. It was thought this would provide a competitive pressure for schools to 
improve their academic achievement levels. Since 1988 the market system in primary 
and secondary education has continued and been strengthened with the introduction of 
new types of school, more emphasis placed on parents’ right to choose their school, 
and the introduction of the School Admissions Code (2007) which prohibits covert 
selection of pupils by schools. 
 
The market has clear limitations in England however. First, oversubscribed schools 
cannot expand to meet demand indefinitely
5. This means that although parents have 
the right to express a preference for schools, their choice is not guaranteed
6. Second, 
failing schools often do not get shut down, which undermines competitive pressure of 
the market. Rather they are ‘turned around’ with a swathe of policies aimed at 
                                                                                                                                            
as the presence of older siblings at the school. The Schools Admissions Code (2007) standardised 
schools’ admission codes.  
4 The administrative data is a combination of the schools database for England, EduBase, and elements 
of the Pupil Level Annual Schools Census, PLASC, along with other components of the National Pupil 
Database, NPD. More details of this unique schools data set can be found in section 3. 
5 Also, beyond a certain point they need official permission to expand 
(http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/schoolorg/guidance.cfm?id=5 accessed 2/11/09)  
6 Oversubscription criteria determine whether a parent is successful in their first choice. Most schools’ 
admissions are controlled and co-ordinated by their local authority (LA). In these cases, places at 
oversubscribed schools are determined by criteria such as proximity and whether an older sibling 
already attends the school. Voluntary Aided and Foundation schools are able to set their own 
admissions criteria. Additional criteria may include whether the school was named as the ‘first 
preference’ on the LA application form, and the pupil’s religious denomination in the case of faith 
schools. Parents are aware of these criteria, and may decide not apply to an oversubscribed school they 
deem as unfeasible. 4 
improving their test results and often with additional financial investment. Finally (the 
focus of this paper) it is not obvious that academic standards are necessarily of prime 
concern to parents. Many other factors may be important to parents when they express 
their preference for school, including, for example, the peer group and pastoral care at 
the school.  
 
A number of studies have explored the process of parental choice in detail, often 
focusing on parents’ stated preferences for schools. Survey responses consistently 
show that academic factors are found to be important to parents (West and Pennell 
1999; Coldon and Boulton 1991; Denessen et al 2005; Kleitz et al 2000). Denessen et 
al (2005) analyse the importance given to a range of reasons for choice of school in 
the Netherlands. They find that ‘quality of education’ is given the most importance on 
average, followed by the ‘school climate’, ‘whether the school pays attention to the 
child’ and ‘order and discipline’. Factors relating to the peer group of the school are 
ranked as the least important reason; the ‘possibility to come in contact with other 
cultures’ was given the least importance, followed by the ‘other parents are our kind 
of people’. 
 
Kleitz et al (2000) study data generated from 1,100 charter-school parent surveys in 
North Texas. They find that over 90% of parents in the survey say that education 
quality in the school was important or very important to them. Class size was also 
important to over 80% of parents; proximity by slightly less, while whether friends 
were attending the school was reported as important or very important by the fewest 
number of parents. In the US Schneider, Marschall, and Teske (2000) and Schneider 
et al (1998a) find substantial race and class differences in household preferences for 
schools. Parents with a college education cite diversity and teaching values as 
important concerns and place less importance on test scores and discipline than 
parents with less education. This may reflect the type of schools that pupils are 
already in, however. Jacob and Lefgren (2007) also find evidence that parents in high 
income/low income schools have different preferences. They find some support for 
the notion that less educated parents have less concrete ideas about how a ‘good’ 
education is achieved, while more educated parents take a strong academic foundation 
as given.  
 
The dominant concern regarding school choice is that it will lead to stratification 
along social or ethnic lines, as different parents value different things in schools 
and/or face different constraints in realising their choice (Ball 2003; Reay, 2003; 
Butler and Robson 2003). Schneider and Buckley (2002, page 134) describe the 
concern that low-income and less educated parents have a “particular 
susceptibility…to fall for the attraction of non-academic (and thus “wrong”) school 
attributes”. Studies have generally found that parents’ stated preferences vary 
according to their socio-economic background and ethnicity (Gewirtz et al 1995; 
Hastings et al., 2005; Weekes-Bernard 2007; West and Pennell 1999), although Kleitz 
et al (2000) report no differences between sub-groups of their population of 
‘choosers’.  
 
Interpreting this evidence can be problematic as parents’ stated preferences may differ 
from their true preferences. This may be particularly true regarding socially sensitive 
issues such as school ethnic composition (Jacob and Lefgren, 2007). Academic 
standards may only be mentioned by parents as a ‘socially desirable’ response, for 5 
example, when school composition is in fact more important to them. Unless faced 
with choices in a realistic setting, revealed preferences are not elicited.  
 
Schneider and Buckley (2002) report the “remarkable consistency” in the verbal 
(survey) responses of parents about what they value in schools. They cite six papers 
based on survey data that find that academic and teacher quality are the most 
important reasons given by parents in their choice of school. They note, however, that 
the “optimistic” conclusions based on survey responses are in contrast to evidence 
from revealed preferences. They use an online schools database in Washington, DC to 
monitor parent search behaviour as an indicator of parent preferences. Through 
analysing this search behaviour, they find a “strong bias toward accessing the 
demographic characteristics of the student population, which is in marked contrast to 
verbal reports about the importance of race” (Schneider and Buckley 2002, page 138). 
The authors also cite other work in the US which supports this finding: Weiher and 
Tedin (2002) show that when choosing charter schools parents in Texas were likely to 
“sort themselves along racial/ethnic lines . . . in spite of their expressed preferences, 
rather than in conformity with those expressed preferences” (Weiher and Tedin 
(2002), page 91, italics added). 
 
Finally, Buckley et al (2006) use survey data in Chile to assess whether stated and 
revealed preferences are consistent. They find that while all parents in Santiago say 
they are seeking strong academic programs in their children’s schools, they actually 
choose schools that are widely different on academic quality but similar on 
socioeconomic dimensions. The authors conclude that parents choose “class – not the 
classroom”, which stated preferences do not reveal. Our data allow us to investigate 






Our primary data source is the Millennium Cohort Study (MCS), which is a 
longitudinal dataset funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
and a consortium of Government Departments headed by the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS). The MCS was sampled from all live births in the UK, which for 
England and Wales took place over a 12 month period from 1 September 2000 and 31 
August 2001. This period coincides with the school academic year, meaning that 
children in the study in England and Wales form an academic cohort. The MCS is 
designed to chart the initial health, social and economic conditions of new births in 
the new millennium (MSC Guide to the Datasets 2008). 
 
For England, the sample was selected from a random sample of electoral wards, 
disproportionately stratified to ensure adequate representation of deprived areas, 
defined as the poorest 25% of wards based on the Child Poverty Index (CPI)
7, and 
also areas with high concentrations of Black and Asian families
8. Weights provided 
with the data are applied to the analyses reported here to correct for the over-
                                                 
7 The CPI is defined as the percentage of children under 16 in an electoral ward living in families that 
were, in 1998, receiving at least one of the following benefits: Income Support; Jobseekers Allowance; 
Family Credit; Disability Working Allowance, and is therefore a proxy for neighbourhood deprivation. 
8 ‘High’ is defined as above 30% of the ward. Proportions are based on the 1991 national census. 6 
representation of disadvantaged and high ethnic minority wards and so to enable us to 
draw nationally representative inferences. The sample draws from all children that are 
living in the UK at age nine months and eligible to receive Child Benefit at that age. 
Child Benefit is a payment made to all main carers and so has extensive coverage; it 
excludes only those whose residency is temporary
9.  
 
Our study uses data from England only, as school policy and admission arrangements 
differ between countries in the UK and because the administrative data for schools we 
use is collected in England only. 5,748 children were sampled from ‘advantaged’ 
wards, 5,946 from the ‘disadvantaged’ and 3,461 from the wards with a proportion of 
ethnic minorities greater than 30%. Due to ineligibility of some families and refusal to 
participate by others, the final sample achieved was 11,533, with a breakdown of 
4,617, 4,522 and 2,394 for the respective groups. 
 
Our paper uses the third survey of the MCS, carried out in 2006 when children in the 
study are five years old. The timing of the third survey was deliberate: the children 
were beginning primary school and a main objective of the MCS was “to record the 
child’s transition to primary school, from the point of view of their parents and their 
school” (MCS Guide to the Datasets 2008; page 13). A consultation process in 2004 
decided that it would be useful to assess issues around school choice, including 
detailed questions on parents’ preferences for schools and information on the schools 
they actually applied to (MCS Consultation Group 2004). Variables such as the 
reasons parents give for their ‘first choice’ of school, the most important reason in this 
choice, and whether parents achieved their desired school are taken from this section. 
The data allows us to investigate parents’ stated preferences for schools and to 
compare the findings from the MCS with previous national and cross-country 
evidence. 
 
We also explore parents’ revealed preferences for schools. This involves comparing 
schools in the surrounding area with the school named as the ‘first preference’ on the 
Local Authority (LA) application form. We compare the first preference school with 
other schools in the locality in relation to a number of characteristics, which requires a 
detailed dataset containing information on all primary schools in England. To create 
this dataset we combine variables from two data sources; EduBase and the National 
Pupil Database (NPD).  
 
EduBase is a register of all educational establishments in England and Wales, 
maintained by the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). EduBase 
contains administrative information for each school, whether it is in the state or 
independent sector. This includes the type of school (whether voluntary aided, 
voluntary controlled etc.), phase of education (primary, middle or secondary) and its 
exact location (postcode).  
 
The NPD is an administrative dataset that covers all pupils in state schools in 
England. This dataset contains information on pupils’ attainment at each Key Stage 
level of the National Curriculum, and also information from the pupil level census 
such as each pupil’s eligibility for free school meals, recognition of any special 
                                                 
9 The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) estimates that 97.2% of children received Child 
Benefit by 7 months of age in 2000.  7 
educational need and whether they have English as an additional language. Providing 
this information for the census (previously known as PLASC, now the Annual 
Schools Census) is a statutory requirement for all maintained schools in England; data 
should therefore be accurate and reliable. We aggregate the pupil level data to school 
level, which gives us school level variables such as the percentage of pupils in the 
school that are eligible for free school meals (FSM), a proxy for low income; the 
percentage that have any special educational need (SEN); and the percentage that 
have English as an additional language (EAL). From the attainment data we also 
construct a measure of each school’s average Key Stage 2 (KS2) points score, and the 
percentage of pupils that achieve level 5 in all subjects at KS2
10. These indicators are 
calculated for the cohort of pupils taking the tests in 2003, which were published in 
school performance tables in 2004 and so were available to MCS respondents when 
making their school choices
11.  
 
Variables taken from EduBase and those constructed from the NPD are combined to 
form a detailed schools dataset. This dataset does not include information on average 
attainment or composition for schools in the independent sector as information for 
these schools is not collected by the DCSF. Our schools dataset enables us to compare 
schools in the local area with the schools nominated by parents on their LA 
application form. In section 4 we explain how we construct an indicator for whether 
any particular school represents a feasible choice for parents in terms of the distance 





4.1 Stated preferences for schools  
 
The MCS survey contains a detailed set of questions on parents’ preferences for 
schools, their actual nominations on their LA application form, whether they got the 
school that they named as ‘first preference’ on that form, and whether they are happy 
with their child’s allocated school
12.  
 
The main respondent (usually a parent) is first asked whether they applied for a 
primary school place through their local authority’s application form. This is the 
standard method of application: all parents who would like a place for their child at a 
state primary school should complete the form. Parents are then asked to give details 
(name, address and postcode) of the schools they put as their first, second, and third 
nominated preferences on the application form if applicable.  
 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of parents that either expressed no preference on their 
LA application form, or one, two or three preferences. Around a quarter say they did 
not complete the LA application form for schools. We believe this proportion is not 
                                                 
10 Level 5 is above the expected level of attainment at KS2 set by government. This indicator therefore 
represents the proportion of pupils that achieve highly at the end of primary school.  
11 School performance tables are available online each year from the Department of Children Schools 
and Families (DCSF), for example see: http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/performancetables/primary_08.shtml, 
where a variety of statistics on school performance are published.  
12 Full details of the questions asked at wave 3 of the survey can be found at 
http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/studies.asp?section=0001000200010011. 8 
representative; statistics collected from a sample of LAs suggest that over 90% of 
parents complete this form as it is compulsory for allocation to state primary schools. 
This would seem to imply that our data suffer from one or more of: potential recall 
bias, whereby a proportion of parents cannot recall, even a short time afterwards 
(around one year), that they completed the LA form; parents misunderstanding the 
question in the survey; parents wanting to take a short-cut in the questionnaire. 
 
Following this question, parents are asked what factors were important to them when 
they considered which school to nominate as their first preference. Specifically, they 
were presented with a list of reasons for their school nominations and asked “Which 
of these factors were important in choosing to put this school as first choice on the 
form?” More than one reason could be given. Most parents give multiple reasons for 
choosing a particular school (the mean number of reasons given was 4.09), although 
this varies slightly by parent characteristics such as education and socio-economic 
status. 
 
Table 1 shows the percentage of main respondents that named each reason on the list 
as an important factor in their first choice nomination. 67.28% of parents say that 
proximity to the family home and 62.87% say that a ‘general good impression’ of the 
school is important. These two reasons are the most commonly cited but whether 
siblings attend the school and academic standards are also mentioned by a large 
percentage of parents (46.93% and 43.55% respectively). Small class sizes are 
mentioned by around a fifth of parents (18.70%) and religion by around a tenth 
(10.24%). Only 3.91% of parents state that the ethnic mix of the school is an 
important consideration, but 22.43% mention that where the child’s friends are likely 
to apply is an important factor. This final consideration may mean that parents choose 
schools that have a pupil intake with similar characteristics, such as ethnicity and 
social class.  
 
As shown in Table 1, parents give a large number of reasons for their first choice 
school. For ease of analysis we group these reasons into ten categories, as shown in 
Table 2. Appendix 1 gives the details for the grouping. The majority of parents 
(67.95%) cite proximity and/or ease of travel as important reasons for their naming a 
school as their first preference on the LA application form. A high percentage gives a 
‘general good impression’ of the school (62.90%), as does the school’s characteristics 
and facilities (52.36%). Whether a sibling attends the school is another important 
reason often given (46.93% of parents), with academic standards slightly less 
(43.55%). The reasons given for the choice of first choice school in our data are 
consistent with previous evidence on parents’ stated preferences for schools as 
discussed above.  
 
In our data the majority of respondents give more than one stated reason as important 
in their decision for their first nominated school. Although we do not know the 
ranking for these stated reasons, we do know the reason they recall was the ‘most 
important’. Respondents are asked: “And, which of these was the single most 
important reason (for putting this school as first choice)?” From this question we can 
identify the main reason for their choice, although caveats apply. These are stated 
preferences, and when answering this question parents may not consider all reasons, 
may be reluctant to give socially undesirable responses, or may have forgotten initial 
decisions which later conditioned their choices, for example moving house. There 9 
may also be a certain amount of recall bias, or parents justifying their decision ex 
post. These shortcomings are discussed more fully below and in a companion paper to 
the present one (Burgess et al. 2009). 
 
As before we group the list of most important reasons into ten categories. The 
percentage of parents giving each grouped reason as the ‘most important’ is given in 
Table 3. Around a quarter of parents say that proximity and/or ease of travel are the 
most important reasons for their school choice, with a similar proportion saying that a 
sibling already attending the school is most important. Around 16% of parents say 
that academic standards are the most important consideration, and about the same 
proportion say a ‘general good impression’. Very low proportions of parents cite other 
reasons as the ‘most important’ in their choice of first preference school on the LA 
form. The responses for ‘most important’ reason for choice of school are consistent 
with previous evidence on parents’ stated preferences for schools.  
 
Given the concern that differences in parents’ preferences may lead to social 
stratification in schools, we also investigate the extent to which parents’ stated 
preferences vary by socio-economic status and ethnicity (see also Henig 1996; Lee at 
el 1996). 
 
Table 4 shows the variation in ‘most important’ reason given, by the main 
respondent’s highest educational or vocational qualification. 40% of those with no 
educational or vocational qualifications say that proximity is the most important 
factor in their choice. Those with no qualifications are almost twice as likely to give 
proximity as their most important reason as compared to those with at least a degree 
or equivalent qualification. In contrast, those with degrees are over twice as likely to 
say that academic standards are the most important reason: 20.27% of those with at 
least a degree give this response, compared with 7.80% of those with no 
qualifications. A similar pattern exists for the percentages giving a ‘general good 
impression’ as the most important reason. More educated individuals are also over 
twice as likely to give religious grounds as the most important reason.  
 
Table 5 shows that a similar pattern exists between those with low and high levels of 
socio-economic status.
13  Around one third of those in the lowest SES quintile gave 
proximity as the most important factor, compared to fewer than one in five of those in 
the highest quintile citing this reason. Higher SES parents are more likely to cite 
academic standards and a ‘general good impression’ of the school as the most 
important reason. As with variation by education, those with higher SES are also 
more likely to give religion as the most important reason for their school choice. 
 
The evidence discussed in section 2, however, suggests that it is important to analyse 
parents’ revealed preferences for schools rather than relying on survey data or stated 
preferences alone. In addition to removing any bias caused through a desire to 
conform to socially desirable norms, parents may also conflate preferences for 
                                                 
13 Our measure for socio-economic status is derived from principal component analysis and includes 
the following parental variables: whether the main respondent reported financial difficulties in wave 3 
of the survey, the highest NS-SEC (National Statistics Socio-economic Classification) of the 
household, housing tenure, and logged equivalised income. Those in the lowest quintile have the lowest 
level of socio-economic status, and those in the highest quintile have the highest. See appendix 2 for 
full details of the procedure. 10 
schools. For example, parents may state that proximity is the most important factor in 
their school choice when in fact they have moved house to be close to a school that is 
their most preferred for other reasons. Through using revealed preferences, i.e. 
looking at the characteristics of the school they actually nominate as their first 
preference, we can identify parents’ preferences for schools with more certainty than 
by using survey data alone.  
 
4.2 Revealed preferences for schools  
 
To understand the extent to which our data reveal parental preferences we need to 
briefly recap the primary school admission process in England. Parents are invited to 
apply for a school place through the local authority (LA) application form, on which 
up to three schools can be named as preferred schools
14. They are named in order of 
preference, so the school named first on the application form should be the school that 
parents most prefer (for qualifications to this see below). Using this form the LA 
allocates pupils to schools, aiming to maximise the number of parents getting a place 
at one of their preferred schools. When a school is oversubscribed published 
admissions criteria determine which pupils will be admitted. Admissions criteria for 
community and voluntary controlled schools are decided by the local authority and so 
are common across schools in any one local authority. Voluntary aided and 
foundation schools control their own admissions and so criteria may vary. 
Applications to all schools, no matter what type, must be through the co-ordinated 
admissions form. The allocation process is as follows: 
 
1)  Parents complete and return their application forms to the LA, stating their 
preferences in order. 
2)  All schools nominated on the application form are asked whether a place for 
the pupil is available at the school. At the time of application by the MCS 
cohort, whether the parent named the school as 1
st, 2
nd or 3
rd preference on the 
LA form was used as admissions criteria by schools in some LAs. In others, 
the rank order was not taken into account
15.  
3)  All schools have a binding maximum capacity for entry places. Whether the 
school has a place for the pupil depends on the number of entry places it has in 
a given year. If a school is oversubscribed, entry is usually determined on 
proximity to the school, or ‘catchment area’ after siblings, pupils in care and 
those with a statement of special educational needs have been accepted. 
4)  If a pupil is deemed to be eligible for a place in more than one school, the 
allocation will be determined by the LA through considering which school has 
been ranked highest on the parent’s application form.  
 
                                                 
14 A few LAs invite more preferences, but the mode is 3. See Coldron et al (2008) for more details. 
15 Under ‘equal preferences’ admission criteria, where rank order is irrelevant, parents’ incentives are 
consistent with naming their most preferred school as the highest rank on the LA form. Under ‘first 
preferences first’, parents may be more strategic. The admission criteria of ‘first preferences first’ 
means that admissions bodies prioritise pupils who named the school as first choice on the preference 
form. This creates a big risk for parents, as naming an oversubscribed school as your first preference 
means you reduce the likelihood of entry into your ‘default’ school, where it is different. Coldron et al 
(2008) surveyed LAs and found that around 32% used ‘first preference first’ admission criteria in 
2006/2007, two years after after our cohort applied to primary school. In addition to this, schools that 
control their own admissions may apply ‘first preference first’ criteria even where the LA does not. 11 
All parents intending to send their child to a state primary school should complete the 
LA application form. If parents say that they applied for a school place through the 
LA application form, the MCS survey then asks “What is the full name of the school 
that you put as first choice on the form?” as well as the address and postcode of the 
school. This question is repeated for the second and third choices if made. We take 
the school named as the first preference as the ‘revealed’ preference of the parents.  
 
We are aware that the revealed ‘choice’ (first preference) we observe may be 
constrained in some way. The school that parents name as the first choice on the 
application form may reflect resigned acceptance rather than true preference if parents 
view their truly desired first preference as unfeasible. Expressing a preference for the 
most oversubscribed school in the neighbourhood, for example, especially if it is far 
away, may seem like a wasted choice. This may be particularly true for families living 
in disadvantaged neighbourhoods who are likely to be further from the most 
oversubscribed and/or high attaining schools. In areas which operated under ‘first 
preference first’ admission criteria in 2004/2005, the risk of putting an oversubscribed 
school as the first preference is amplified (see footnote 15). To at least partly address 
this problem we incorporate a further question in the MCS in our analysis. Parents 
were also asked “were there any schools you would have liked [cohort child's name] 
to attend but chose not to apply to?” and were then asked to name this school. We 
represent parents’ revealed preferences for primary school by parents’ first nominated 
school if they do not say there was another school they would have liked to apply to 
but didn’t, and the school that parents would have liked to have applied to but didn’t 
if this is applicable
16.  
 
In practice when filling in the LA application form, parents are choosing between a 
range of ‘local’ schools, often within their own local authority. In the context of 
parents’ revealed preferences for schools we want to look at the choice of school out 
of all such schools that are feasible for the parent, which we call the parent’s ‘feasible 
choice set’. By comparing the characteristics of the chosen school with those in the 
choice set, we can elicit parents’ revealed preferences across these characteristics. 
Given that all schools in the choice set are feasible, the school the parents name on 
their application form should be the parents’ most truly preferred school from the set 
of schools they can reasonably access. We can then compare this revealed preference 
to our evidence of parents’ stated preferences. 
 
4.3 Defining the ‘feasible choice set’ 
 
The process of defining this feasible choice set is essential. At first thought it may 
seem that all schools within a certain distance are feasible for parents, for example 
within 3km from the home. This distance may vary between rural and urban areas due 
to different norms and transport links, but the same concept would hold in all areas: 
within a certain travel distance all schools are considered feasible by parents. By 
looking at school choice within this set of schools we could then identify parents’ 
revealed preferences. There is a flaw with this line of enquiry however; parents will 
be unlikely to waste a nomination on a school they know is unattainable. Within any 
specified distance boundary, some schools will be popular and have a small 
                                                 
16 663 parents, or around 7% of the sample say that they would have liked to apply to another school 
but didn’t for some reason. 30.77% of these parents say they did not apply because they were doubtful 
the child would get in, 30.17% because the school was too far away or because of travel constraints.  12 
catchment area. Other schools will be less popular and may admit pupils from a larger 
distance. We assume that parents have some knowledge of how popular each school 
is, or where pupils generally travel from to get to the school. Popular schools with 
small catchment areas may not be a realistic choice, and so should not be included in 
the parent’s feasible choice set. We incorporate this into how we calculate our feasible 
choice set by first defining each school’s catchment area as follows:  
 
1)  Calculate the straight-line distance between the school and home address for 
all pupils in the reception year group in 2004. This is the entry cohort in the 
year before the MCS cohort entered primary school and therefore the year the 
MCS respondents applied to schools.  
2)  Calculate the 80
th percentile: the straight line distance within which 80% of 
the pupils in the previous year’s intake live. 
 
We calculate this catchment area based on the previous year’s entry as this is the year 
that is most relevant to prospective MCS parents. Most LAs provide information on 
the number of applications for entry and the number of places possible to be allocated 
in the previous year, which gives an indication of relative supply and demand. This is 
presented alongside other school information in the application booklet and so is 
easily accessible. Some LAs also give further information on oversubscribed schools, 
for example how far away the furthest pupil lived from the school in the previous 
year. To be in the feasible choice set, we also impose that the school must be in the 
same LA and within 20km of the pupil
17. 
 
So, to summarise, for every MCS respondent in our sample we calculate the set of 
schools that are feasible for them to choose between. To be in this feasible choice set 
a school has to be in the same LA and within 20km of the family’s home address, and 
the family must live within the radius from which 80% of the school’s intake has been 
drawn the previous year.  
 
Parents can change or manipulate their feasible choice set in various ways. Parents 
may decide to move house to improve the likelihood of entry into their desired school; 
they may invest more time in religious activities to gain entry in faith schools; they 
may opt out of the state education system altogether and pay for an independent 
school. We abstract from these issues here, but in a companion paper we restrict the 
sample of parents to those who have not moved house since the cohort member was 
born (Burgess et al. 2009); the results from this sample and the full sample of families 
are not substantively different. We exclude those in independent schools in our 
sample as we look at preferences expressed on LA application forms





                                                 
17 This final restriction is simply to ensure that schools with very large catchment areas, such as 
boarding schools, are excluded from the feasible choice set. 
18 In practice, 89 parents apply to the local education authority for a state school place and place their 
child in a fee paying school. This represents 22% of all pupils in fee paying schools. 51 of the parents 
who applied to both the state and independent sector were not allocated their first nominated school in 
the state sector, suggesting some ex post decision making. We abstract from this issue because of the 
small sample size of the subgroup. 13 
4.4 The ‘type’ of schools available in the feasible choice set 
 
Table 6 shows that schools in the average feasible choice set vary across different 
types of family
19. Schools in the feasible choice set for parents in the lowest SES 
quintile have a much higher average FSM rate (22%) compared to those in the choice 
sets within which families in the highest SES quintile are located (11%). Parents in 
the lowest SES quintile have schools which have higher proportions of pupils with 
EAL than parents in the highest SES quintile (12% compared to 8%), and pupils are 
also more likely to have any level of SEN (21% compared to 17%). Schools available 
for low SES parents are less ‘white’, and more likely to have lower proportions of 
high attaining students; an average of 17% of pupils get all level 5 at Key Stage 2 for 
low SES parents, compared with 23% for high SES parents. High SES parents are 
more likely to have access to voluntary controlled schools. 11% of schools for high 
SES parents are voluntary controlled, compared with 6% of schools for low SES 
parents. Similar differences in the characteristics of available schools exist between 
those with no educational or vocational qualification and those with at least a degree.  
 
These differences in available schools across parent types highlight why it is 
important to consider a parent’s school choice relative to all others available in their 
feasible choice set. Without considering choices of school in a relative context we 
would estimate a parent’s preferences based on absolute attainment of schools in their 
area. Table 6 shows that on average, all types of parents have some variation across 
school characteristics within their feasible choice set, which suggests most parents 
have some choice between school types. They could, for example, feasibly apply to a 
high scoring school with a low proportion of pupils eligible for FSM or a low scoring 
school with a high proportion of pupils eligible FSM (both defined relative to their 
local area
20). We argue that the availability of this choice to most parents can enable 
us to genuinely illicit parents’ revealed preferences. 
 
4.5 Parents’ revealed preferences: the characteristics of their chosen school 
 
Given the definition of the feasible choice set above, in this section we ask: what type 
of school do parents choose (i.e. put first on the LA form), relative to all the others 
available to them? Do they choose the most highly attaining school in terms of KS2 
results, the school with the lowest proportion of low income students, or the nearest 
school? To look at these questions we rank the schools in each pupil’s feasible choice 
set by each of these three school characteristics in turn. A school ranked number 1 
will be the school with the highest KS2 mean score, the lowest proportion of pupils 
eligible for FSM, or the one to which they live closest to in the feasible choice set, 
depending on which school characteristic they are ordered by
21.  
                                                 
19 Different parent types also have different numbers of schools in their feasible choice set, and we 
account for this below. 
20 A “low scoring” school is defined as a school with KS2 attainment (averaged over 3 years) below 
that of the median school in the pupil’s feasible choice set. A “high scoring” school is defined as a 
school with KS2 attainment (averaged over 3 years) above the median school. If the school has the 
same average KS2 attainment as the median school, they are randomly assigned to either the “high” or 
“low" scoring category. The same methodology is used to define “rich” and “poor” schools relative to 
all schools in the feasible choice set. 
21 We could choose to rank these characteristics either from low to high or high to low. By using the 
ranking here we do not mean to imply that schools with low numbers of FSM-eligible students are in 14 
 
Table 7 shows the rank of school that parents choose when schools are ranked by their 
KS2 mean. The table splits parents by their SES quintile and reveals differences in 
school choice across parent type. A rank of 1 means that, on average, the parent SES 
type chooses the most highly performing school in their feasible choice set, a rank of 
2 means they choose the second most highly performing on average, and so on.  
 
Different parent types have different numbers of schools available in their feasible 
choice sets. Those in the lowest SES quintile have 5.46 schools in their feasible 
choice set on average, compared with 5.28 for those in the highest SES quintile. 
Although this is not a large difference, to control for the number of schools in the 
feasible choice set we present the statistics separately by the number of schools 
available. Column 1 of Table 7 shows the rank of school chosen for parents that have 
5 schools in their feasible choice set, column 2 for those that have 8, and column 3 for 
those that have 10. Rows show the rank of school chosen for parents of different 
levels of socio-economic status (SES). This enables us to compare the choices across 
parent types while holding constant the number of schools they are able to choose 
between. Sample sizes for each group are also given.  
 
Consider first column 1, comparing parents who have five schools in their feasible 
choice set. On average, parents with low SES choose a lower ranked, i.e. lower 
performing, school, than those in the highest SES quintile: 3.45 compared to 2.69 
(both out of five available; a difference in ranking of 0.76). Table 7 shows that there is 
more variation between parents of high and low SES in areas where there are more 
schools in the feasible choice set. The difference in ranking is 1.65 for those with 
eight schools, and 2.54 for those with ten
22.  
 
Table 8 shows that parents’ preferences are more varied when comparing school 
choices over schools ranked by the proportion of students that have free school meals 
(FSM). For those with eight schools in their feasible choice set, the average parent in 
the lowest SES quintile chooses a school that is ranked 5.26 out of 8. The average 
parent in the highest SES quintile chooses a school that is ranked 3.72 (again out of 8) 
on average, 1.54 schools higher in the ranking. For those with ten schools in their 
feasible choice set, the difference between the highest and lowest SES is around 4 
schools in the ranking (8.12 compared with 3.82), although the sample size is small in 
this case.  
 
This analysis shows that parents of different socio-economic status choose a school 
based on different characteristics. Those with high SES tend to choose a school 
ranked more highly in its academic quality, and with a lower proportion of pupils 
eligible for FSM. We are aware that any interpretation of these differences must be 
cautious however, as they could arise for a number of reasons: 
 
1)  The high performing school has covert admission requirements. This could 
mean that parents’ preferences are the same, but some parent types are more 
                                                                                                                                            
any way ‘better’ than those with high numbers. Rather, we are illustrating the process of parental 
choice between schools with different proportions of different student types.  
22 The difference is also clear when accounting for the total number of schools in the feasible choice 
set. Using the ratio of the school rank chosen to the total number of schools, the differences between 
high and low SES are 0.152, 0.20 and 0.25 for the 5, 8 and 10 school cases respectively. 15 
constrained than others. We have accounted for this as fully as possible in our 
definition of feasible choice sets, as pupils in the previous year travelled at 
least as far as pupil i. We cannot, however, account for the extent to which 
knowledge of such covert selection practices may stop some parents from 
applying to such schools. 
2)  Within the feasible choice set, the high performing school is still further away 
for low income families.  
3)  All parents attend the local school. This means that in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods it looks like parents ‘choose’ high-FSM schools explicitly, 
and the opposite in advantaged neighbourhoods.  
4)  Parents have different preferences for schools. In rural areas and areas with 
fewer schools, we do not observe these different preferences as parents must 
choose the same schools. In urban areas and areas with many schools in the 
feasible choice set (so there are more options) parents are free to choose and 
we observe the differences in preferences more clearly.  
 
Our data does not allow us to investigate point 1. This would involve qualitative 
research into schools’ admission requirements (in practice, not simply as stated on 
admissions forms). For some recent evidence into secondary school admissions see 
Pennell et al (2006) for London and Coldron et al (2008) for England. Points 2 and 3 
are related. If all parents nominate the closest school, either through actual preference 
or constraints on their choice, then our model of revealed preferences will simply 
show that parents prefer schools in their immediate neighbourhoods, no matter what 
their characteristics. If pupils with FSM are clustered in areas where other pupils also 
have FSM, then the school their parents choose will have a high proportion of FSM 
pupils. Similarly, if pupils are clustered with similar ability types, then high ability 
pupils will appear to ‘choose’ high attaining schools, and low ability pupils will 
appear to choose low performing schools.  
 
Table 9 gives some evidence that parents in all SES quintiles attend a school close to 
their home. For those with five schools in their feasible choice set, those with low 
SES nominate a school which is ranked 2.47 on average. This is between the 2
nd and 
3
rd closest school in the feasible choice set and similar to high SES parents who 
nominate a school which is ranked 2.10 on average. For those with eight schools in 
their feasible choice set parents in all SES quintiles choose a school which is between 
3 and 3.5 schools away on average, so again there is little variation. There is slightly 
more variation for those with 10 schools, between 3.53 for the lowest SES quintile 
and 5.13 for the fourth SES quintile.   
 
In each size of feasible choice set, parents choose a close school. Relative to other 
school characteristics, there is remarkably little variation between SES quintiles: all 
parent types choose a close school. This suggests that either parents choose a close 
school, no matter what its characteristics, or that parents self select into 
neighbourhoods with their desired school type. If neighbourhood characteristics are 
correlated with school characteristics and parents choose the closest school, this 
would explain the variation in school rank chosen when schools are ranked by school 




4.6 Who gets their first choice?  
 
The average parent has five schools with varying characteristics within their feasible 
choice set, which suggests that parents do have some degree of school choice. What 
about the outcome of this choice process? In our data a very high proportion of the 
parents who completed the LA form report getting their first choice of school (94%). 
This is consistent with individual reports collected from LAs
23. Furthermore, we find 
little variation in the proportion of parents getting their first choice school across SES 
quintiles, main respondent’s education level, or IMD deciles
24. It may be however, 
that parents of disadvantaged backgrounds are adjusting their preferences on the LA 
form to reflect a resigned choice and we investigate this further.  
 
Figure 2 shows that there is variation in the proportion of families getting their highest 
nominated school between different types of geographical areas. Those with fewer 
schools in their local area are more likely to get a place in their most highly 
nominated school, with the exception of those with no schools within 3km. Those in 
more densely populated areas are less likely to get their most highly nominated 
school. This suggests that geographical location and population density are significant 
factors in whether a pupil is allocated their most highly nominated school. This may 
be because there are more excess school places in areas where population density is 
lower, because parents are willing to travel further, or are willing to apply to a risky 
‘ambitious’ school in more densely populated areas.  
 
Taking this further, we find that although the proportion of parents getting their first 
choice of school does not vary by SES, the price of being ambitious in your school 
choice does. In the sample as a whole, parents that apply to the highest ranked school 
in their feasible choice set have a lower probability of admittance. For example, Table 
10 shows that 91% of parents that choose the most highly ranked school in terms of 
mean KS2 score are admitted compared to 97% of parents that choose the least highly 
ranked school. Thus there is a potential risk or penalty associated with choosing 
higher ranking schools. This risk is more evident for students in the lowest SES 
quintile. Only 80% of low SES parents that choose the school ranked most highly in 
terms of academic achievement are admitted, compared with 91% of those in the 
highest SES quintile. Although on average parents of different types are equally likely 
to gain admittance to their ‘most preferred’ school on the LA application form, this is 
not the case if parents of low SES apply to a school with the best academic 
achievement in their area. This is consistent with qualitative evidence from Weekes-
Bernard (2007) who surveyed British Black and minority ethnic parents, and found 
                                                 
23 We contacted a small number of LAs to find out the proportion of pupils that were allocated to their 
first choice school. The high proportion is also consistent with data for secondary schools, which is 
collected by the government. In 2008 82% of families got their highest preference school, ranging from 
64.5% in London to 92% in the North East. 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/STA/t000791/index.shtml 
24 IMD is the Index of Multiple Deprivation. This index combines a number of indicators, chosen to 
cover a range of economic, social and housing issues, into a single deprivation score for each small 
area in England. This allows each area to be ranked relative to others according to their level of 
deprivation 
(http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/) . 
The Indices of Deprivation 2007 have been produced at Lower Super Output Area level (of which there 
are 32,482 in the country). 17 
that many felt constrained in their choice of school, ruling out schools that were 





School choice is central to the English system of school admissions, and has been a 
major element of government policy for more than two decades. Parental school 
choice has its supporters and its critics. Those who believe in market power suggest 
that giving parents the right to choose the school their child attends will tend to cause 
schools to compete with one another and raise academic standards as a consequence. 
This positive view is implicitly based on the assumption that parents will choose 
schools that are more effective in raising levels of academic achievement. Critics 
argue that parents may not, however, choose on the basis of academic achievement 
but rather on other potentially divisive factors, such as ethnic and/or social class 
composition. We first investigate these issues by following the majority of the 
literature and examining parents’ stated preferences. We then use our preferred 
strategy and look at parents’ revealed preferences for schools based on the choice they 
make on their primary school admission form, comparing the characteristics of the 
schools they choose relative to all other feasible schools available to them. This 
method is an improvement on relying on stated preferences alone, since what parents 
feel comfortable admitting as the reasons for their school choice may not match their 
real motivations, as revealed by their actual choice of school.  
 
Around a quarter of parents cite proximity and ease of travel as the most important 
criteria behind their choice. By contrast, only 4% of parents state that the ethnic mix 
of the school is an important consideration. On the face of it therefore, parents do 
choose, if not on academic standards per se (only half of parents cite this as being 
important and just 16% put it as the most important factor), but on the convenience 
and characteristics of the school. We do find however, that the reasons cited for 
school choice vary across different types of parent. More educated and higher SES 
parents are more likely to cite academic standards and a “general good impression” of 
the school, whilst lower educated and lower SES parents are more likely to cite 
proximity.  
 
When we turn to revealed preference we are careful to compare the parents’ actual 
choice of school, i.e. the school they put first on their local authority application form, 
with other feasible schools in their neighbourhood
25. This is important as, 
unsurprisingly, different types of schools are available for higher and lower SES 
parents and their children. On average, more advantaged parents choose a better 
performing school relative to others in their choice set, particularly in areas with many 
schools and therefore a lot of potential school choice. More advantaged parents are 
also likely to choose schools with much lower proportions of pupils eligible for free 
school meals relative to other schools available to them. Whilst parents do not admit 
to choosing schools on the basis of their social composition, there is evidence that this 
is happening in practice. Conversely, lower SES parents are less likely to apply to 
socially advantaged schools, perhaps because they feel they will not be able to get 
                                                 
25 In a companion paper to this (Burgess et al 2009) we further investigate the extent to which parents’ 
first preferences on their application form represent their true preference as opposed to constraints they 
face in the current school choice system. 18 
into such schools (perhaps due to unobservable illicit admission requirements or, 
equally, social norms). These results may not however, be purely driven by different 
types of parent having different preferences for a particular type of school. When we 
undertake formal modelling of the choice process (Burgess et al. 2009), we find that 
in fact many apparent differences in parental preference are insignificant. What 
matters more is location. We find strong and compelling evidence that parents do tend 
to choose a nearby school. This of course would also tend to undermine the process of 
school choice which relies on parents choosing better schools rather than closer ones. 
 
Is there any truth then to the idea that poorer children are de facto excluded from 
some higher performing or socially advantaged schools? In general most parents get 
their first choice of school (94%) and this is equally true for both more and less 
advantaged parents. Our results indicate however that this is partially because poorer 
parents make more ‘realistic’, i.e. less ambitious, choices on their LA application 
form, reflecting differences in preference and/or constraint (Burgess et al 2009). 
Where low SES parents make ambitious school choices they have a much lower 
chance of securing their first choice of school than similarly ambitious high SES 
parents. Geographical location and population density are also significant factors in 
whether a pupil is allocated their most highly nominated school. Again this has 
implications for school choice policy. If, in areas where there is a lot of potential 
competition between schools, more advantaged families have a higher chance of 
achieving their more ambitious choices than do poorer parents, this could tend to 
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Figure 1: The percentage of main respondents giving none, one, two, or three 
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Figure 2: The proportion of parents that get their first choice school (as 
nominated on their LA application form), by the number of schools within a 3km 
radius of their home 
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Table 1: Reasons for nominating the school named as 1st preference on the LA application form 
Reason for school 'choice' 
Number of parents 
that give reason 
% of parents that 
give reason 
School is near or nearest to home  6260 67.28 
His/her friends go or were intending to go there  1837 22.43 
His/her brother/sister went/go there  4320 46.93 
Other relative/parent went/go there  1241 13.25 
Wanted them to go to a different school to friend(s)  73 0.79 
Wanted them to go to a different school to brothers/sisters  39 0.42 
Wanted them to go to a different school to other relative/parents  31 0.25 
How likely it was that he/she would get a place  556 6.38 
School has good exam results/academic reputation  3814 43.55 
General good impression of school  5483 62.87 
School has strong anti-bullying policy  1105 12.52 
School has small class sizes  1548 18.70 
School caters for special needs  475 4.94 
School offers specialised curriculum e.g. music, dance, activities   546 6.04 
School has good facilities  3237 37.87 
School offers childcare for parents who work or study  515 5.78 
School is a feeder school  422 5.25 
Religious grounds  978 10.24 
Easy to get to on public transport  216 2.21 
Ethnic mix of the school  470 3.91 
School teaches in a language other than English  132 1.11 
Wanted him/her to go to single-sex only school  1 0.01 
Other reasons relating to the other children who go to the school  98 1.05 
Did not like other/ local school  12 0.14 
Reasons to do with nursery class/ pre-school  25 0.23 
Connections (incl family) with school  45 0.51 
Convenient location incl. close to childcare  123 1.42 
Good school - good for specific reasons not elsewhere specified  4 0.02 
Note: The table gives unweighted frequencies and percentages using survey weights. Parents were asked: “Which of these factors 
were important in choosing to put this school as first choice on the form?” Multiple answers could be given. If their child was already 
attending a nursery class at this school, parents were asked to give the reason they chose to send their child to that nursery class.  
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Table 2: Reasons for nominating the school named as 1st preference on the LA application 
form, grouped by type of reason 
Reason for school 'choice', grouped 
Number of parents that 
give reason 
% of parents that give 
reason 
Proximity/ease of travel  6331 67.95 
Sibling Rule  4320 46.93 
Other family/friends  2874 33.00 
Academic standards  3814 43.55 
General good impression  5489 62.90 
School characteristics and facilities  4512 52.36 
Strategic  927 10.97 
Religion  978 10.24 
School composition  558 4.84 
Pre-school & childcare  653 7.30 
 Note: The table gives unweighted frequencies and percentages using survey weights. Parents were asked: "Which of these 
factors were important in choosing to put this school as first choice on the form?" Multiple reasons could be given If their 
child was already attending a nursery class at this school, parents were asked to give the reason they chose to send their 
child to that nursery class. Details for the way reasons were grouped can be found in appendix table 1. 
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Table 3: Most important reasons for nominating the school named as 1st preference on the LA 
application form, grouped by type of reason 
Reason for school 'choice', grouped 
Number of parents that give 
reason  % of parents that give reason 
Proximity/ease of travel  2,566 25.56 
Sibling Rule  2,350 24.98 
Other family/friends  466 5.12 
Academic standards  1,521 16.62 
General good impression  1,439 16.72 
School characteristics and facilities  475 5.19 
Strategic  62 0.73 
Religion  315 3.27 
School composition  44 0.4 
Pre-school & childcare  97 1.04 
Note: The table gives unweighted frequencies and percentages using survey weights. Following the question on the 
reasons for their choice of school, parents were asked: "And, which of these was the single most important reason (for 
putting this school as first choice)?" Details for the way reasons were grouped can be found in appendix table 1. 26 
 
Table 4: Most important reason for school choice, by the highest educational or vocational qualification of the main respondent 
   Highest educational or vocational qualification of the main respondent  




GCSE       
grades D-G  
 GCSE        
grades  A*-C 
AS/A level or 
diploma in 
higher ed.  Degree + 
Missing  0.88 0.05 0.16 0.33 0.39 0.41 
Proximity/ease of travel  40.64 31.99 29.70 24.06 20.14 20.42 
Sibling Rule  29.07 26.16 24.62 26.25 24.41 21.06 
Other family/friends  7.00 4.75 7.91 5.59 4.34 3.08 
Academic standards  7.80  13.29 12.21 16.84 20.89 20.27 
General good impression  8.95  13.94 13.86 16.55 17.55 22.78 
School characteristics and facilities  3.69 4.95 6.72 5.46 5.21 4.56 
Strategic  0.15 0.32 0.60 0.65 0.84 1.37 
Religion  1.58 3.81 2.77 2.81 4.24 4.32 
School composition  0.11 0.35 0.46 0.36 0.38 0.59 
Pre-school & childcare  0.12 0.39 0.99 1.09 1.60 1.16 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: The table gives percentages using survey weights. The table should be read down the columns, for example 40.64% of those with no educational qualification give 'proximity' as 
the most important reason for their choice of school. 
 
  27 
Table 5: Most important reason for school choice, by the main respondent's socio-economic status (in quintiles) 
   Socio-economic status (SES) of the main respondent  
Most important reason given 
Lowest 
quintile 2nd  quintile  3rd  quintile 4th  quintile 
Highest 
quintile 
Missing  0.5  0.39 0.27 0.29 0.39 
Proximity/ease of travel  32.21 27.67 26.53 21.73 18.38 
Sibling Rule  29.08 25.65 27.59 23.97 20.73 
Other family/friends  6.8 6.05 4.8 5.11  2.92 
Academic standards  9.95 15.43  16.34  19.08 22.1 
General good impression  12.03 14.64 14.92 18.13 23.39 
School characteristics and facilities  6.6  5.45 5.18 4.63 4.46 
Strategic  0.31 0.18 0.53  0.9  1.57 
Religion  1.4 3.1  2.86  4.57  4.12 
School composition  0.38 0.43 0.24 0.44 0.39 
Pre-school & childcare  0.75 1 0.74  1.16  1.54 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Note: The table gives percentages using survey weights. The table should be read down the columns, for example 32.21% of those with the lowest SES choose 
'proximity' as the most important reason for their choice of school. The variable for SES was created using principal component analysis. Details of this procedure can 
be found in appendix 2. The lowest quintile contains the fifth of the sample with the lowest socio-economic status. 
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Table 6: Mean characteristics of all schools in the feasible choice set, split by parent characteristics     
   Parental characteristics 
Mean school characteristics 
Full 
sample  Low SES  High SES 
No 
education Degree  + 
Proportion of students eligible for FSM  0.16  0.22  0.11  0.23  0.12 
Proportion of students with EAL  0.11  0.12  0.08  0.18  0.11 
Proportion of students with some SEN  0.19  0.21  0.17  0.21  0.18 
Proportion of students that are white  0.87  0.84  0.90  0.77  0.87 
Proportion of students with level 5 in all KS2 subjects  0.19  0.17  0.23  0.16  0.22 
KS2 mean score (averaged over 3 years)  27.79  27.34  28.28  27.25  28.22 
Proportion of schools: community schools  0.56  0.58  0.55  0.55  0.54 
Proportion of schools: voluntary aided schools  0.33  0.35  0.32  0.38  0.33 
Proportion of schools: voluntary controlled schools  0.09  0.06  0.11  0.06  0.11 
Proportion of schools: foundation schools  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02 
"Catchment area"  2064.04  1894.45  2251.61  1741.62  2360.38 
Note: Weighted values are shown. Statistics are calculated from all schools in the feasible choice set. The feasible choice set is defined as all 
schools for which the pupil lives within the schools' catchment area, in the same LA and within 20km. Catchment areas are defined by the 
straight line distance in which 80% of pupils in the previous cohort lived. Those with 'low SES' are those parents who are in the lowest socio-
economic quintile, 'high SES' in the highest socio-economic quintile. Socio-economic quintile was computed using principal component 
analysis; details can be found in appendix 2. The proportion of schools refers to the proportion of non fee paying schools in the pupils' feasible 
choice set. 
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Table 7: The rank of school chosen within the feasible choice set: ranked by KS2 mean 
  
The rank of chosen school, where schools are sorted by their KS2 
mean 
  Those with 5 schools 
Those with 8 
schools 
Those with 10 
schools 
   Mean rank  N  Mean rank  N  Mean rank  N 
Lowest SES quintile  3.45  208  5.70  70 6.36  25
2nd SES quintile  3.06  199  5.28  69 5.71  29
3rd SES quintile  3.11  211  4.38  65 5.70  10
4th SES quintile  2.74  222  3.86  66 4.59  17
Highest SES quintile  2.69  174  4.05  70 3.82  12
Note: Schools are ranked from highest to lowest, so a rank of 1 indicates the most highly scoring school in the feasible 
choice set. The feasible choice set is defined as the schools for which the pupil lives within the catchment area. 
Catchment areas are defined by the straight line distance in which 80% of pupils in the previous cohort lived. SES refers 
to the main respondent's socio-economic quintile, defined using principal component analysis (This process is defined in 
appendix 2).  
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Table 8: The rank of school chosen within the feasible choice set: ranked by the proportion of 
students with FSM 
  
The rank of chosen school, where schools are sorted by their 
proportion of students with FSM 
  Those with 5 schools  Those with 8 schools 
Those with 10 
schools 
   Mean rank  N  Mean rank  N  Mean rank  N 
Lowest SES quintile  3.51  208  5.26  70 8.12  25
2nd SES quintile  3.09  199  4.81  69 6.39  29
3rd SES quintile  3.08  211  4.03  65 6.80  10
4th SES quintile  2.50  222  4.08  66 4.41  17
Highest SES quintile  2.62  174  3.72  70 3.82  12
Note: Schools are ranked from lowest to highest, so a rank of 1 indicates the school with the lowest proportion of 
students with FSM in the feasible choice set. The feasible choice set is defined as the schools for which the pupil lives 
within the catchment area. Catchment areas are defined by the straight line distance in which 80% of pupils in the 
previous cohort lived. SES refers to the main respondent's socio-economic quintile, defined using principal component 
analysis (This process is defined in appendix 2).  
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Table 9: The rank of school chosen within the feasible choice set: ranked by the distance from 
the pupil's home 
  
The rank of chosen school, where schools are sorted by their distance 
to the pupil's home 
  Those with 5 schools  Those with 8 schools 
Those with 10 
schools 
   Mean rank  N  Mean rank  N  Mean rank  N 
Lowest SES quintile  2.47  204  3.15  78  3.53  40
2nd SES quintile  2.25  215  3.33  95  4.05  40
3rd SES quintile  2.06  218  3.40  96  3.88  17
4th SES quintile  2.23  248  3.50  97  5.13  31
Highest SES quintile  2.10  218  3.08  110  4.25  21
Note: Schools are ranked from lowest to highest, so a rank of 1 indicates the closest school (calculated using straight 
line distances) in the feasible choice set. The feasible choice set is defined as the schools for which the pupil lives 
within the catchment area. Catchment areas are defined by the straight line distance in which 80% of pupils in the 
previous cohort lived. SES refers to the main respondent's socio-economic quintile, defined using principal component 
analysis (This process is defined in appendix 2).  
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Table 10: The proportion of pupils that get their first choice 
school (as nominated on their LA application form), by the 
rank of the school in terms of KS2 mean attainment. 






KS2mean KS2mean KS2mean 
1  0.91 0.8 0.91 
2  0.93 0.93 0.95 
3  0.93 0.93 0.93 
4  0.95 0.94 0.94 
5 0.97  1  1 
Note: The table gives weighted percentages. Schools are ranked from highest 
to lowest, so a rank of 1 indicates the most highly attaining school in the 
feasible choice set.  
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Appendix 1: Grouping of survey responses 
Group 
            Response 
N 
Proximity/ease of travel   
School is near or nearest to home  6260 
Easy to get to on public transport  216 
Sibling rule   
His/her brother/sister went/go there  4320 
Other family/friends   
His/her friends go or were intending to go there  1837 
Other relative/parent went/go there  1241 
Wanted them to go to a different school to friend(s)  73 
Wanted them to go to a different school to brothers/sisters  39 
Wanted them to go to a different school to other 
relative/parents 
31 
Connections (including family) with school  45 
Academic standards   
School has good exam results/academic reputation  3814 
Good impression of the school   
General good impression of school  5486 
Good school - good for specific reasons not elsewhere 
specified 
4 
Did not like other/ local school  12 
School characteristics/facilities   
School has strong anti-bullying policy  1105 
School has small class sizes  1548 
School caters for special needs  475 
School offers specialised curriculum e.g. music, dance, 
activities 
546 
School has good facilities  3237 
Wanted him/her to go to single-sex only school  1 
School teaches in a language other than English  132 
Strategic   
How likely it was that he/she would get a place  556 
School is a feeder school  422 
Religion   
Religious grounds  978 
School composition   
Ethnic mix of the school  470 
Other reasons relating to the other children who go to the 
school 
98 
Pre-school &childcare   
School offers childcare for parents who work or study  515 
Reasons to do with nursery class/ pre-school  25 
Convenient location incl. close to childcare  123 
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Appendix 2: Detail of socio-economic status derivation 
Socio-economic status: Principle Component Analysis 
We create a single measure of parents’ socio-economic status (SES) for our 
analysis instead of including many separate but correlated variables, following 
the method used by the IFS in recent work. We use principal component 
analysis (PCA) to identify the component which explains most of the variance 
in SES. Based on this “1
st component” (which explains 42% of the variance in 
SES) we split the sample into quintiles. Those in the lowest SES quintile have 
the lowest SES, and those in the highest SES quintile have the highest. 
 
The variables we used in PCA are as follows: 
1)  Whether the main respondent reported financial difficulties. This is a 
binary variable taken from wave 3 of the survey. 
2)  The highest National Statistics Socio-Economic Status (NSSEC) of the 
household, taken from wave 3 of the survey. 
3)  Housing tenure, taken from wave 3 of the survey. Whether the 
household lives in privately rented accommodation, social housing, or a 
mortgaged/owned property are entered as binary variables. 
4)  Logged equivalised household income. We average measures of 
household income over all waves, and weight for the number of people 
and type of person in the household using the McClemens score. 
Household members were given the following scores to weight by: 
First  adult      0.61 
Spouse/partner   0.39 
Other second adult    0.46 
Third  adult      0.42 
Subsequent adults     0.36 
Dependant aged 0-1   0.09 
Dependant aged 2-4   0.18 
Dependant aged 5-7   0.21 
Dependant aged 8-10  0.23 
Dependant aged 11-12   0.25 
Dependant aged 13-15   0.27 
Dependant aged 16+   0.36 
 